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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTENSEN DIAMOND PRO-
DUCTS COMPANY, a Utah Cor-
poration, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THERON S. COVEY, et al., 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
8039 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent agrees generally with the Statement 
of Facts which Appellants have set forth in their 
brief. Inasmuch, however, as the Trial Court was 
entitled to and did find adversely to the Appellants, 
Respondent feels that emphasis should be properly 
placed upon those facts favorable to the Respondent. 
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2 
Accordil1gly, certain of the testimony referred to 
by the Appellants is not entitled to persuasive weight 
on appeal. 
The case appears to hinge largely upon the pro-
visions of the "Joint Operating Agreement." Since 
Respondent considers many of the provisions of this 
Agreement which are omitted by the Appellants 
from their brief to have great bearing upon this suit, 
Respondent does not subscribe to the statement of 
Appellants in their Statement of Facts that o~ly the 
provisions of that Agreement set forth in their brief 
are the material provisions upon the question of 
whether or not a mining partnership existed. Respon-
dent will point under the appropriate arguments 
additional provisions which it deems material and 
decisive. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Christensen Diamond Products Company, the 
Respondent herein, filed suit against the Appellants 
and other defendants to recover the value of a dia-
mond drill bit and other merchandise which was 
purchased and used in the drilling operation on the 
Bertie Slaugh No. 1 oil well, which is the well in-
volved herein. The Trial ruled in favor of the Plain-
tiff and Respondent on the basis ~hat a mining part-
nership existed between the Appellants and Baird & 
Robbins. The existence of that mining partnership 
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depends to a large extent upon the "Joint Operating 
Agreement" heretofore referred to and into which 
the parties entered. 
Christensen Diamond Products Company sold 
the merchandise to Baird & Robbins under circum-
stances set forth by Mr. William I. Harris, Sales and 
Credit Manager of that company, as follows: 
M. E. Baird came into Mr. Harris' office and 
stated that they wanted some drilling equipment for 
coring a well in the Uintah Basin. He came into the 
office in response to the suggestion of Mr. Harris after 
Mr. Baird had contacted the Christensen Diamond 
Products Company salesman in the Vernal area. 
At the time Mr. Baird came into the office, he told 
Mr. Harris in response to inquiry that he had a silent 
partner in Pocatello harned H. L. Robbins and that 
there were others in Salt Lake City who had a fi-
nancial interest in the lease and well being drilled 
(Tr. 90-91). As the result of this conversation, credit 
was extended. Thereafter, merchandise was de-
livered to the well site, and billings thereon were 
directed to "Baird & Robbins" or to "Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Company, 16-Y2 South Main Street, Salt 
Lake qity, Utah" (Ex. J. K. L. M. 0. and P.). On one 
occasion a core bit was picked up at the Christensen 
Diamond Products Company by M. E. Baird and was 
billed to "Baird & Robbins, Vernal, Utah," and was 
signed by "M. E. Baird" (Ex. M). On another 
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occasior1, I-I. L. Robbins signed a core barrel rental 
agreement wjth the Christensen Diamond Products 
Co1npany (Ex. 0), which agreement showed the well 
ownPr or contractor to be "Baird & Robbins." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The Evidence Sustains Finding No. 6, that Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Co., Inc., had no Separate Existence in the Drilling of 
the Oil Well Here Involved. 
II. A Mining Partnership Existed by Virtue of the Joint Operating 
Agreement. 
A. Sharing of Losses 
1 . An agreement for the sharing of losses is not a neces-
sary requisite of a mining partnership. 
2. There is no agreement in this case against Sharing of 
Losses. 
3. In the absence of an Express Agreement Against Shar-
ing of Losses, an Implied Agreement to Share Such 
Losses Arises. 
4. There was an Express Agreement for the Sharing of 
Losses. 
B. All Elements of Joint Operation and Control Necessary to 
Make out a Mining Partnership exist in this case. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Point I. 
The Evidence Sustains Finding No. 6, That Baird & 
Robbins Drilling Co., Inc., Had No s·eparate or 
Independent Activity, Function, or Existence in the Drilling 
of the Oil Well Here Involved. 
Point I of the Appellants' brief attacks Finding of 
Fact No. 6, which is as follows: 
"That by the terms of the aforesaid 'Joint 
Operating Agreement' the said M. E. Baird 
and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, were author-
ized alternatively to employ individuals for 
the actual drilling and operation of the well or 
to employ the services of a corporation to be 
wholly owned by the said M. E. Baird and H. 
L. Robbins; that on or about December 26, 
1948, the said M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins 
did, in fact, organize and form a Utah corpora-
tion wholly owned by the said M. E. Baird and 
H. L. Robbins, having the corporate name of 
'Baird & Robbins Drilling Co., Inc.,' that there-
after the said M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins 
intermingled the funds and assets of the afore-
said partnership and of the aforesaid corpora-
tion and generally conducted the business 
affairs of the said partnership and of the said 
corporation, particularly with regard to the 
drilling of the aforesaid well, without regard 
to the individual capacity or separateness of 
the said partnership and corporation, to the ex-
tent that the said Baird & Robbins Drilling Co., 
Inc., had no separate or independent activity, 
function, or existence in the drilling of the 
aforesaid well or the development of the afore-
said property." 
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The argument made by the Appellants under 
Point I, in which they cite several cases in which 
the "corporate veil" may be pierced to reach personal 
liability on the part of stockholders, has no applica-
tion to the proposition which is involved herein. This 
is 11ot a case in which the inquiry is whether or not 
the corporation as an entity can be disregarded for 
the purpose of holding individual stockholders liable 
(which is the basis of the authorities cited by the 
appellants) it rather involves the question of whether 
or not the corporation actually did the drilling work 
here involved as a separate and distinct entity or 
whether or not the corporation, "Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Co., Inc.," the partnership, "Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Co.," and the individuals, Baird and Robbins, 
are so closely intertwined, and the business affairs 
which were conducted by them were so intermingled 
that the Court could say, as it did, "Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Co., Inc., did not as a separate entity drill 
this oil well." 
Actually, in view of Finding No. 5 of the Court 
that "at all times hereinafter mentioned the defend-
ants, M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, carried on busi-
ness as co-partners under the firm name and style 
of 'Baird & Robbins Drilling Company'; that in ·said 
partnership capacity the said M. E. Baird and H. L. 
Robbins, jointly with the Covey, conducted the oper-
ated the operation and drilling of the well on the 
above-described property," Finding No. 6 is probably 
immaterial. What we are really concerned with is 
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''rhether or not there is sufficient evidence to indicate 
that Respondent dealt with the mining partne~ship 
which the Court found to exist. 
While the Appellants do not raise this as one 
of the point upon \vhich they rely, they do, none-
theless, state under Point I that there is no evidence 
to support the finding that the well was drilled by 
the partnership, and accordingly we desire at this 
point to set forth in some detail the evidence which 
we contend establishes ( 1) that the "Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Co., Inc." did not have a separate identity 
in the drilling operation, and (2) that the Court 
properly found that the mining partnership of M. E. 
Baird and H. L. Robbins and the Coveys jointly con-
ducted the operation and drilling of the well. 
It should be noted parenthetically, however, 
that, if the Appellants were correct in their statement 
at the top of page 14 of their brief that "if the corpora-
tion did the drilling and purchased supplies from the 
Respondent, there was no partnership with Appel-
lants and no mining Partnership," then the Appel-
lants would have been liable to the Respondent on 
the Second Cause of Action, which the Respondent 
(plaintiff below) asserted against these parties, that 
is, that these Appellants and the other defendants 
failed to require of their contractor, the Corporation, 
a performance as required by Sees. 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 
U.C.A. 1953. 
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It becomes important at the outset to determine 
what activities the partnership of Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Company actually engaged in. 
'!'hat such a partnership existed cannot be 
doubted. M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins declared 
themselves to be a partnership in the "Joint Oper-
ating Agreement" (Ex. C). On December 15, 1948, 
M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins opened a partnership 
account in the Continental Bank and Trust Company 
of. Salt Lake City, Utah, in the name of "Baird & 
Robbins Drilling Company," with only the partner, 
M. E. Baird, entitled to sign checks thereon (Ex. F). 
This, of course, was before the "Joint Operating 
Agreement" came into existence. However, on Jan-
uary 20, 1949, some 15 days after the "Joint Oper-
ating Agreement" \Yas signed, the partners, M. E. 
Baird and H. L. Robbins, signed a a new signature 
card on the same acconut (Ex. G), in which they 
reiterated that they were partners and ·that the name 
of the partnership at that time was "Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Company." 
As heretofore indicated, Mr. M. E. Baird repre-
sented to Mr. Harris, Sales and Credit Manager for 
Christensen Diamond Products Company, that he 
was in a partnership with H. L. Robbins. 
There is also abundant evidence of the inter-
mingling of the partnership and corporatjon fund 
and activities. 
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Substantially all of the funds which were used 
in the drilling operation of the Bertie Slaugh No. 1 
well passed through this account. A combination 
journal, ledger, and check register was maintained 
(Ex. No. 260), which shows the deposits which were 
made in the Co11tinental Bank in the partnership 
account and the withdrawals which were made 
therefrom in connection with the drilling operation. 
A comparison of this account with the ledger cards 
of that bank (Ex. H) and the cancelled checks (Ex. 
6, 7, and un-numbered exhibit dated July, 1949) 
illustrates that substantially all of the monies ex-
pended in the drilling operation came from this 
partnership account. That this account was never 
changed from a partnership account is verified by 
the testimony of Miss Mary Ballen, particularly at 
pages 89, 94, and 98 of the Transcript. Miss Ballen 
testified that she had searched the records of the 
Continental Bank and Trust Company and found no 
other account than the partnership account, "Baird 
& Robbins Drilling Company," and specifically that 
there was no account for Baird & Robbins Drilling 
Co., Inc. 
An examination of the checks which are exhibits 
(Ex. 6, 7, and un-numbered exhibit dated July, 1949) 
in the case, reveals that the checks were obviously 
printed as partnership checks to correspond to the 
partnership account in the Contine.ntal Bank and 
Trust Company. However, someone at some time on 
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a great number of these checks was added in ink 
following the designation, "Baird & Robbins Drilling 
Co." which is printed at the bottom of the checks, 
the word, "Imc." or, in some instances, "Inc." There 
is no evidence whatsoever to establish when the inked 
portion was added. In addition, several counter 
checks are to be found in the above exhibits which 
are signed, "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." 
A further fact which tends to establish the lack 
of individual identity on the part of Baird & Rob-
bins Drilling Co., Inc., is the fact that they assumed a 
name which is so nearly identical with the partner-
ship as to render it unlikely that anyone dealing 
with one or the other of the entities would realize 
that yet a second entity existed. 
It is to be observed that no evidence was pro-
duced of a separate contract with the corporation or 
otherwise to drill this well. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence 
amply sustains the proposition that Baird & Robbins 
Drilling Co., Inc., did not have an identity separate 
and apart from the partnership in the drilling of the 
oil 'veil and that the Court was justified in disregard-
ing the corporation and finding that, in fact, the Re-
spondent dealt with the partnership and that the part~ 
nership conducted the operation and drilling of the 
well on the above-described prope!ty. 
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POINT II. 
A Mining Partnership Existed 
i\ppellants divide their argument as to the non-
existence of the mining partnership into two sub-
divisions: ( 1) That there was no partnership be-
cause there was no sharing of losses, and (2) that 
there was no partnership because there was no joint 
cot1trol or operation. For convenience in answering 
these arguments, Respondent will follow the same 
general outline. 
A. SHARING OF LOSSES 
An agreement for the sharing of losses is not a 
necessary requisite of a mining partnership. 
In a mining partnership, as distinguished from 
a general partnership, there need be no sharing of 
losses in order to establish the existence of a partner-
ship relation. Sharing of losses flows from the ex-
istence of a mining partnership arrangement as one 
of the incidents thereof, but it is not one of the re-
quirements necessary to create that relationship. 
The development of the concept of a mining 
partnership, as separate and distinct from general 
partnership, is a development which is unique in 
the western states, where this concept originated. 
It arose from the needs of the area, to meet specific 
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and indigenous problems created by the development 
of the western mining industry. It does not partake 
of the refinements which are to be found in general 
partnership law and is not tested by the same stand-
ards. 1,his is well stated by Summers Oil and 
Gas, Permanent Edition, Volume 4, Section 721, 
wherein that. author states: 
"Through recognition by the courts of 
customs and usages in mining communities it 
has become a settled principle of law in many 
of the jurisdictions in this country that when 
co-owners of interests in mineral lands join 
together in working such land for mineral pur-
poses they thereby create a new relationship 
known as a mining partnership. This rela-
tionship has been recognized by statutes in 
some of the mining states." 
And in Section 724 he continues: 
"In the western states, where mm1ng 
partnership was first recognized, joint owner-
ship and joint operation of land for mineral 
purposes was held sufficient to creal the rela-
tionship." (Italics added) 
The requirements of joint ownership and joint 
operation are the only basic requirements for a min-
ing partnership, and they comprise what is some-
times described as the American Common Law of 
Mining Partnerships. As indicated by Section 721, 
this relationship has been codified in some of the 
mining states ( 4 Summers Oil and Gas, Perm. Ed., 
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Sec. 722). In other states, such as Utah, it has been 
recognized by judicial precedent (Bentley vvs. Bros-
sard, 33 Utah 396, 94 Pac. 7 36). 
At Section 724 of Summers' Oil and Gas, Perm. 
Ed., Vol. 4, the author indicates that some states do 
not subscribe completely to the doctrine of a partner-
ship as developed in the West and have added 
other requirements for its creation. However, most 
of the states continue to require only the elements 
heretofore set forth-that is, joint ownership and 
joint operation-in order to create a mining part-
nership. To quote the remainder of that section: 
"In other states where the relationship 
has been recognized and applied to various 
types of mining, except in Pennsylvania, Ok-
lahoma, and probably Texas, the requisites 
for its creation and existence remain the 
same.'' 
It is to be observed that the cases upon which 
Appellants rely, to support the proposition that shar-
ing of losses is an essential requirement .to establish 
the ex;istence of a partnership, are Oklahoma cases, 
with a single exception. That exception is an Iowa 
case which is decided by a midwestern state on gen-
eral partnership law. Consequently, it would be 
proper to say that the Oklahoma citations represent 
a minority view as to the requirements for the exist-
ence of a mining partnership and that the Iowa case 
·of Farmers and Merchants National Bank vs. Ander-
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son, 216 I. 988, 250 N.W. 214, cannot be looked to 
as an authority upon the proposition of a mining 
partnership under western mining partnership law. 
1,hat the law of mining partnership embraces 
only the requirements of joint ownership and joint 
operation is indicated in the case of Meister vs. Far-
row, 109 Mont. 1, 92 Pac. 2nd 753 wherein the 
court held that these elements were sufficient to 
create a mining partnership and that these are the 
only necessary elements. 
A statement of the Montana statute which codi-
fies the American Common Law of Mining Partner-
ship, is also found in Wilkinson vs. Bell, ________ Mont. 
--------, 168 P. 2d 201. Significantly, this and similar 
codifications provide: 
"An express agreement to become part-
ners or to share the profits and losses of min-
ing is not necessary to the formation and 
existence of a mining partnership. The rela-
tion arises from the ownership of sh~res or 
interests in the mine and working the same for 
the purpose of extracting the minerals there-
from." 
Summers' Oil and Gas, Perm. Ed., Vol. 4, Sec. 
724, indicates that the ,courts which have added 
additional requirements to the creation of a mining 
partnership have confused the .incidents. which flow 
from the existence .of such a legal relationship witl1 
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the elements vvhich are necessary to the creatio11 of 
such a relationship. This is exemplified by the 
following quotation from Section 724 of that work: 
·'In Munsey vs. Mills and Garrity the 
Texas Court of Appeals recognized that a min-
ing partnership arises by operation of law from 
joint operation of a mine by co-owners, al-
though it held in that case that a m~ning part-
nership was, in fact, created by the develop-
ment contract. Again, in Wagner Supply Co. 
vs. Bateman, the Supreme Court very clearly 
held that a mining partnership may be created 
by operation of law; yet the language of the 
court in this opinion has since been interpreted 
to mean that, for the creation of a mining part-
nership, there must be a sharing of profits,· a 
community of interests, and a mutual agency 
between partners, the usual elements of the 
ordinary partnership, in addition to co-owner-
ship and joint operation. The confusion in 
these later cases seems to arise from the failure 
of the courts to distinguish between the facts 
necessary for the creation of a mining partner-
ship and the legal relationship between the 
partners once the relationship has been ac-
tually created. 
Of equal interest in establishing that it is not 
necessary that there be an agreement to share losses, 
either express or implied, are the cases which hold 
that persons dealing with the mining partnership are 
not bound by limitations on the sharing of losses 
between partners which are not communicated to 
them. See Rae vs. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P. 
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2d 1060, wherein the Court quoted from Kennedy vs. 
Conrad, 91 Mont. 356, 92 P. 2d 1078 as follows: 
"The general rule is that, as to thir4 
persons who deal with a joint adventurer in 
good faith and without knowledge of any limi-
tation upon his authority, the law presumes 
him to have been given power to bind his asso-
ciates by such contracts as are reasonably nec-
essary to carry on the business in which the 
joint adventurers are engaged, and they be-
come liable on such contracts notwithstanding 
they may have expressly agreed amongst 
themselves that they should not be liable." 
In the Utah case, Bentley vs. Brossard 33 Utah 
396, 94 Pac. 736, the court, speaking on the question 
of existence of a mining partnership, stated: 
"Again, referring to the contract of de-
fendants, it seems quite clear that they asso-
ciated themselves together to work and develop 
the group of mines in question for their com-
mon benefit; that each had an interest in and 
to the lease, and in working and developing 
the properties, and in carrying on the mining 
operations; and that each had a community 
interest in whatever profits that were to be de-
rived from such operation. The agreement, 
under all the authorities, contains every re-
quisite of a mining partnership." 
2. There is no agreement against sharing of losses. 
Appellants have cited the following provisions of 
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17 
the '·Joint Operati11g Agreement" as evidence of an 
agreement against sharing of losses: 
~'No part of any costs or expenses for the drilling 
of said well * * * shall be charged or be a claim upon 
the second parties." 
·'The corporation shall have no claim against 
the second part~es, nor any lien against said lease-
hold." 
"Operator shall at all times keep the joint in-
terest of the parties herein in and to the leases and 
the product therefrom and equipment free and clear 
of all labor and mechanics' liens and encumbrances." 
These provisions, however, do not constitute an 
agreement against sharing of losses. They constitute 
nothing more than an agreement to share in the ex-
penses of development and drilling only to the extent 
of $16,000.00 plus pipe of a value of $7,500.00. If 
these expenses were the only losses which could arise 
in this drilling operation, then no doubt these pro-
visions alone constitute an express agreement to share 
in the losses in the absence of an agreement that the 
appellants were to be reimbursed for these expendi-
tures in the event the well should fail to produce. 
What Appellants seek to do is to substitute a 
limitation as to certain expenses in place of "losses" 
in its broader sense. 
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In seeking to limit losses to this restricted mean-
ing, it appears that appellants would come within 
the purview of Hill vs. Curtis 154 App. Div. 662, 
139 N.Y.S. 428, where the question involved was 
whether two attorneys were partners, they having 
undertaken certain contingent claims together. The 
Court in reviewing this situation said: 
4
'The agreement clearly provided for par~ 
ticipation in the profits. In effect, it provided 
also for participation in the losses. By its 
terms each of the parties agreed to pay one-
half of the expenses that may be incurred in 
the prosecution of said claims. As the claims 
were taken upon a contingent basis, the only 
losses that could result to the parties thereto 
from the prosecution of the enterprise would 
arise from the time and labor expended and 
the disbursement of money made by them in 
connection therewith. The agreement de-
manded both." · 
Thus, if the terms, "costs" or "expenses," or the 
term "charges" can be used as a substitute for the 
word "losses" and if, in effect, it is Appellants' argu-
ment that a contract that one party shall not be 
charged or liable for charges, costs, or expenses is, in 
effect, an agreement not to share losses-then their 
argument must fail, for the Coveys expressly under-
took in this Paragraph (Paragraph IV. A.) that they 
might be charged with the expenses and costs of 
drilling and development of the well to the extent 
of $16,000.00. 
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3. In the Absence of an Express Agreement against 
sharing Losses, an Implied Agreement to Share Losses 
Arises. 
This principle is one well established in general 
partnership law, and the case of Bentler vs. Brossard 
33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, while not having this ques-
tion directly involved, recognized the rule. 
At Point 2 above we have heretofore pointed 
out that, if the term "losses" can be interpreted to 
embrace only the items which the "Joint Operating 
Agreement" denominates "Expenses of Development 
and/or Drilling," nontheless this would constitute 
an express agreement to share losses. However, we 
feel that the term "losses" has a m.eaning which is 
much more expanded than the limited and narrow 
meaning which Appellants seemingly seek to ascribe 
to it. 
It is doubtful whether an agreement between 
partners to the effect that none of the costs or ex-
penses of a certain phase of the contemplated business 
"shall be charged or be a claim upon" one of the 
partners is an agreement not to share in the losses. 
It should seem that a di~tinction must properly be 
made between the terms "expenses" and the term 
"losses" and that a partner who merely says that, as 
between the parties, certain expenses are not to be 
charged to him is not sufficiently guarding himself 
against the possibility of sharing in the ultimate 
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losses, whether by reason of the unsatisfied claims of 
creditors or whetl1er by merely the expenditure of 
all contributed capital, regardless of any remaining 
indebtedness. 
For the reason, therefore, that ''losses" embrace 
a field much greater than the limitations imposed 
as to sharing certain expenses, as set forth in the 
"Joint Operating Agreement," Respondent asserts 
tl1at, these provisions of the "Joint Operating Agree-
ment" do not constitute an agreement against shar-
ing of losses and that, therefore, on the theory ad-
vanced by the Appellants, either there was an agree-
ment to share losses, as heretofore indicated at Point 
B, or else nothing is said about sharing of losses, and 
therefore, by implication, the sharing of losses fol-
lows from the partnership relationship. 
4. There Was an Express Agreement for the 
Sharing of Losses 
In addition to the argument advanced under 
Point 2, which is limited to the question of sharing 
certain expenses as sharing of losses, the "Joint Oper.:. 
ating Agreement" expressly provides for the sharing 
of losses. 
1. The "Joint Operating Agreement" contains 
provisions which we believe by proper interpretation 
thereof constitutes an express agreement to share in 
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the losses of this er1terprise. This is illustrated in the 
following way: 
Paragraph I. A. of the agreement provides that 
Appellants agree to pay $16,000.00 and receive a 
12-percent interest in the leases, and Paragraph B 
thereof provides for purchase of pipe by Appellants 
of a value of $7,500.00. 
Paragraph IV. A. provides that this money is to 
be used only for payment of drilling and development 
charges on Well No. 1. 
Paragraph VI provides that "all drilling and de-
velopment charges except for the first well ... shall 
be charged to the joint account of the parties hereto" 
under the accounting procedure set forth in Exhibit 
B of the "Joint Operating Agreement." 
Thus, all of the charges of every nature except 
drilling and development charges for the first well 
are to be charged to the joint account of the parties 
in proportion to the interests of the parties under the 
lease. These items, by reference to Exhibit B of the 
"Joint Operating Agreement," consist of such items 
as: delay of rentals, royalties, labor and teaming 
charges, cost of moving materials, cost of moving 
surplus materials, damages or losses incurred by fire, 
flood, storm, or any other cause; expenses of litiga-
tion, judgments, liquidated claims, fees of attorneys, 
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taxes, insurance, camp expenses, and overhead 
charges on the basis of $1,000.00 per month . 
..-fhe only limitation, then upon charges against 
the joint accouut are those specified in Paragraph IV. 
A., heretofore referred to, that is, the expenses of 
drilling and development of the first well. This does 
not constitute an agreement that all of the other 
overhead charges and losses which might arise in 
the drilling of the first well shall not be charged 
against the joint account, but to the contrary, a read-
ing of the above provisions clearly illustrates that all 
other expenses and losses are to be charged to the 
joint acconut. Accordingly, the appellants expressly 
agreed to share in all losses of the operation and all 
overhead expense and charges thereof, thus establish-
ing the element of sharing of losses if such sharing 
of losses is determined by the court to be a necessary 
element in the creation of a mining partnership, 
vvhich we, of course, contend that it is not. 
2. This agreement contemplated the drilling of 
more than one well. The "Joint Operating Agree-
ment" expressly makes provision for the respective 
rights and obligations of the parties in the diilling of 
additional wells. Quite clearly by the terms of Para- . 
graph VI even drilling and development charges 
were to be charged to the joint account of the parties 
in the same ratio in which they shared profits as to 
all wells except the first well. 
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The "Joint Operating Agreement" did not set up 
one partnership for the first well and a separate part-
nership for the remaining wells. The parties agreed 
in one document as to the contribution of capital, 
their ratio of profits, and their respective rights of 
control, etc., and contemplated that these relation-
ships would continue throughout the anticipated 
business of drilling several wells. It will not now 
lie in the mouths of the parties to say that, by limiting 
their loss obligation in a part of the venture to 
$16,000.00 and certain pipe, by undertaking their 
loss obligation as to the balance of the venture in the 
same ratio as they shared profits, they did not as to 
the total venture contemplated by the agreement 
become partners. 
3. Further evidence that the parties contem-
plated a sharing by the Coveys in the costs and ex.:. 
penses of the venture even as to the first well is the 
interesting language of Paragraph VIII.B.: · 
"Non-operators shall have a lien on the 
interests of the operators in said leases and 
agreements and oil and gas produced there-
from, and proceeds thereof, and the material 
and equipment thereof, to secure the payment 
of operators' proportionate share of the costs 
and expenses of developing and operating the 
said lands, for the purpose of keeping said pro-
perty clear and free of liens and encumbrances 
upon the property of non-operators." 
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B. All elements of Joint Operation and Control necessary 
to make out a Mining Partnership exist in this case. 
The following items of joint operation and con-
trol reserved to appellants are to be gleaned from a 
per·usal of the "Joint Operating Agreement": (Ex. C.) 
1. Paragraph IV.A. provides that appellants 
contribution of $16,000.00 is to be used only for 
payment of drilling and development charges in con-
nection 'vith the drilling of this well. 
2. Paragraph IV.B. provides that the operation 
shall be conducted in a good and workmanlike man-
ner and in accordance with good oil field practice. 
It also provides further controls with respect to drill-
ing under terms and conditions customary and usual 
i11 the field in contracts of independent contractors; 
limits the deviation of the well to three degrees; and 
specifies when the well shall be deemed complete. 
3. That the abandonment of any well which 
had produced oil or gas in commercial quantities 
for a period of 30 days should be permitted only by 
Baird & Robbins upon first securing the written ap-
proval of the Coveys (VII.A ( 1) ) . 
4. That no capital expenditure in excess of 
$5,000.00 should be binding upon the Coveys except-
ing with their prior written approval. 
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5. That the vvritten consent of the Coveys would 
be required for all necessary expenditures in the 
drilling, completing, and equipping of the well, in-
cluding the necessary least? tankage (VII.A (2)). 
6. That the written approval of the, Coveys 
vYould be required for the sale and disposition of 
surplus materials and equipment by Baird & Robbins 
(VII.A (3)). 
7. "That all equipment, facilities, and struc-
tures purchased on account of the joint operation of 
the parties" shall be deemed to be owned 12 percent 
by the Coveys (VII.A(3) ). 
8. The Coveys reserved the right of access to the 
lands at all reasonable times to inspect and observe 
operations of every kind and character upon the 
property (VII.B ( 1)). 
9. The Coveys reserved the right of access at all 
reasonable times to any and all information pertain-
ing to wells, drilling, production secured, and oil 
marketed, and to the books, records, and vouchers 
relating to the operation of the lands subject to the 
agreement. (VII.B (2)). 
10. The Coveys reserved the right upon request 
to receive from Baird & Robbins daily drilling reports, 
true and complete copies of well logs, tank tables, 
daily gauge and run tickets, and reports of stock on 
hand (VII.B ( 3) ) . 
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11. The Coveys further reserved the right upon 
request to receive from Baird and Robbins samples 
and cuttings from "any and all wells drilled" on 
lands in which the Coveys had an interest (VII.B (3)}. 
12. By the terms of the said agreement, the said 
Baird & Robbins agreed with the said Coveys and 
undertook to comply with all lawful regulation and 
prepare and furnish reports to any duly constituted 
authority as requested or required by the Coveys. 
(\'III.B). 
13. The Coveys further reserved to themselves, 
subject to the provisions of the aforesaid "Joint Oper-
ating Agreement," "an undivided 12-percent working 
interest in all oil, gas, natural gasoline, and other 
hydrocarbon substances produced, saved, and re-
moved from the lands." (IX.A) 
1 +. In connection with Coveys' agreement to 
purchase for a price of $7,500.00 approximately 3,500 
fee of 4% inch drill pipe in 32-foot lengths (1. C; XI), 
Coveys reserved the right that, upon loading and 
shipping the same, cargo insurance in favor of Coveys 
would be procured by Baird & Robbins, title would be 
taken in the name of Coveys, and the bill of lading 
would be held in the name of the Coveys. 
15. Coveys further reserved the right in connec-
tion with the said pipe to have the same maintained 
upon the land described in the agreen;tent and in a 
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pile identified as the pipe of the Coveys and to receive 
accounts from Baird & Robbins for said pipe at all 
times and to have the same returned following use 
in as good condition as new, save and excepting 
usual wear. (XI. ) 
16. Appellants specified by the medium of the 
joint operating agreement itself (IV-A) that the 
partnership should commence drilling the well on or 
before the 1st day of February 1949; and also that 
of the $16,000, the balance of $8,000 should only be 
paid by appellants to the partnership "upon the com-
mencement of the drilling of the first well." (I. A.) 
Thus it is amply clear that all of the elements of 
joint operation and control necessary under any 
theory of partnership are present in this case. 
Actually, however, control as such does not 
play so important a part in the determination of 
mining partnership existence as Appellants seem 
to indicate. All that is necessary is that there be a 
joint operation, together with joint ownership. This 
rule is clearly announced in Meister vs. Farrow, ( 109 
Mont. 1, 92 P. 2d 7 53), wherein it is said: 
"The rule in Montana, as in other juris-
dictions, is that the requirement that the part-
ners engage jointly in working the property 
may be met where the other features of the 
relationship exist, even though all of the part-
ners do not take part in actually performing 
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work on the mine or take part in the super-
visory work." 
As establishing that joint operation need not 
en1brace more than contributing money, see Meister 
vs. Farrow (supra) and the case of Harper vs. Sloane, 
177 Cal. 174, 169 P. 1043, 181 P. 775, wherein 
the only evidence of joint operation was the contri-
bution of money and wherein the court held: 
"We do not understand that it is essential 
to a mining partnership that each of the part-
ners shall actually perform physical labor 
upon the claim. Where one of them supplies 
money which is to be used in working the 
claim, he is engaged in such work as truly as is 
the one who devotes his own labor to the 
enterprise.'' 
To like effect, see Lyman vs. Schwartz 13 Col. App. 
218, 57 P. 735. 
It is submitted that all of the elements of joi~t 
operation and control necessary to creating mining 
partnership exists under the facts of this case and 
are to be found in the "Joint Operation Agreement" 
the stipulation of counsel that the $16,000.00 was 
paid and the pipe furnished, and the admissions as 
to ownership of an interest in the lease. 
* * * 
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In summary-.L\ppellants were not content to 
merely hire a11 i11dependent firm of drilli11g contrac-
tors. Had they done so without obtaining the statu-
tory performance bond, they would have become 
personally liable to unpaid laborers and material 
men. Nor 'vere the Appellants satisfied to merely 
btly shares by way of investment in an oil develop-
ment. They alone, of all the investors, insisted upon 
a very extensive, complicated, and in many respects 
ambiguous if not inconsistent Joint Operating Agree-
ment which guaranteed them the protection of cer-
tain accounting procedures and many significant 
rights of control and direction if not in fact of actual 
"joint operation" of the well with the Baird & Robbins 
partnership. Now they would like to escape the lia-
bilities which the law imposes upon such mining 
partners by asserting that. the reserved rights of direc-
tion and control which they thus bargained for were 
really unimportant and insignificant, and that be-
cause they relieved themselves from certain specified 
charges or expenses excepting as the same might be 
charged against their $16,0,00 contribution, they were 
mere investors and not mining partners. This is 
certainly an anamalous attempt to create a new rela-
tionship somewhere short of partnership liability 
but certainly far beyond a mere investor. To 
permit an evasion of liability by an owner of land 
who does not secure a performance bond, reserves the 
direction of the improvement work being done, shares 
in the profits, and contributes capital which is at 
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risk in the event of a loss, and undertakes certain ad-
ditional but limited obligations to share in expenses, 
charges and losses from certain portions of the con-
templated venture, is to negative all of the pro-
tections which the Legislatures have carefully built 
up to surrour1d this relationship and which the 
cu1nmon law of mining partnership has amplified. 
A reversal of the trial court's decision invites a sharp 
trader to work out a sui juris relationship completely 
beyo11d the case law or statutory law and to permit 
a participating partner to reap the profits without 
any risk of the losses of his venture. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by the Respondent 
that Finding No. 6 that Baird & Robbins Drilling Co., 
Inc., had no separate or independent activity, func-
tion, or existence in the drilling of the oil well here 
involved is sustained by the evidence; that, however, 
this finding is not essential to the determination of 
this case and that Finding No. 5, which is clearly 
sustained by the evidence, supplies all of the essen-
tials necessary on this phase of the case; that sharing 
of losses is only an incident which flows from the 
relationship of mining partnership and is not one 
of the essentials to the creation of a :rnining partner-
ship; that, nonetheless, if sharing of losses is an essen-
tial to the creation of the mining partnership rela-
tionship, such sharing of losses exists in this case; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
that there is ample evidence of joint operation and 
joint ownership herein to sustain the Trial Court in 
his ruling that a mining partnership did, in fact, exist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OWEN & WARD and 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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